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Article 
The Logical Next Step: 
Motivations on the Formation of a Business and 
Human Rights Treaty 
Graham Markiewicz 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The human rights movement has been hailed as humanity’s 
last utopia. The ideals it espouses are powerful enough to bring 
millions out of poverty, advance equality in the face of diversity, 
and create more free and fair societies across the globe. In 
practice, however, human rights are often used as a tool by the 
powerful to the very detriment of those who should be helped by 
them.1 The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen of 1789, one of the foundational documents of human 
rights thought, both lifted up individuals, protecting their 
rights,2 and helped to dismantle empires. Ho Chi Minh, for 
example, quoted the Declaration to rally support for Vietnamese 
independence from France.3 He later used this independence to 
establish an autocratic communist state in Vietnam.4 
Julius Nyerere, who instituted a security state5 in Tanzania 
and brought millions to the brink of starvation, said: 
 
  Currently serving as a Legislative Assistant in the United States House 
of Representatives; J.D. Boston College Law School, 2016; B.S. United States 
Military Academy at West Point, 2008. The author would like to thank 
Professors Michael Cassidy and Cees van Dam for their mentorship, guidance 
and support.  
1. See generally Kenneth Cmiel, Human Rights, Freedom of Information, 
and the Origins of Third-World Solidarity, in TRUTH CLAIMS: REPRESENTATION 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 107 (Mark Phillip Bradley & Patrice Petro eds., 2002). 
 2. See Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens (Fr. 1789). 
 3. Cmiel, supra note 1, at 110. 
 4. See Ho Chi Minh, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-
war/ho-chi-minh (last visited Oct. 28, 2016). 
 5. See Michael Kaufman, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania Dies; Preached 
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Are [Africans] going to turn round them, tomorrow after 
we have achieved Independence and say, “To hell with all 
this nonsense about human rights; we are only using 
that as a tactic to harness the sympathy of the naive?” 
Human nature is sometimes depraved I know, but I don’t 
believe it is depraved to that extent. I don’t believe that 
the leaders of a people are going to behave as hypocrites 
to gain their ends, and then turn round and do exactly 
the things which they have been fighting against.6 
Such uses of human rights rhetoric diminish its importance and 
makes accomplishing progress less likely. Using rights as a tool 
to establish other ends forces them to become platitudes and 
caused Professor Hersch Lauterpacht to critically denounce “the 
Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] as a humbling defeat 
of the ideals it grandly proclaimed.”7 Therefore, while human 
rights have the capability to be a refuge for humanity, the 
motivations behind them must also be examined. Without due 
diligence in examining motivations and intended policies, 
human rights can, counter-intuitively, be harmful. 
Despite a sinister history of abuse, the global human rights 
campaign continues to advance. In 2011 the United Nations 
published the Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (“UNGP”).8 This soft-law document provided a 
framework for multinational corporations (“MNC”)9 and other 
 
African Socialism to the World, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/15/world/julius-nyerere-of-tanzania-dies-
preached-african-socialism-to-the-world.html?_r=0 (detailing that as President, 
Nyerere gave sweeping powers to the military which in turn enforced heavy 
taxes, collectivization, and nationalized industry). 
 6. Andreas Eckert, African Nationalists and Human Rights, 1940s-1970s, 
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 283, 298 (Stefan-Ludwig 
Hoffmann ed., 2011). 
 7. Samuel Moyn, Human Rights in History, THE NATION (Aug. 30/Sept. 6 
2010), https://www.thenation.com/article/human-rights-history/. 
 8. John Ruggie, Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing 
the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011). 
 9. An MNC, also referred to as a Transnational Corporation (“TNC”), is a 
large, typically Western business operating in foreign countries, usually early 
in the supply chain, such as material sourcing or manufacturing. See Anita 
Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon An 
Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of 
Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91, 91 n.3 (2002); see also 
Detlev F. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for 
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non-state actors to interact with and support human rights 
globally. Following the passage of the UNGP, the next logical 
step is for the adoption of a legally binding instrument that 
would hold multinational corporations accountable for human 
rights violations they are involved with regardless of the 
jurisdiction. Strangely, as discussed below, proponents of a 
Business and Human Rights (“BHR”) treaty are some of the 
worst human rights violators, while those who would ostensibly 
have the most to gain from this treaty are against it. 
This Article examines the motives behind positions for and 
against the idea of a BHR treaty. It attempts to discover what a 
binding instrument would mean for state signatories and why 
they may or may not support such a treaty. It first examines the 
processes leading to the UNGP and looks at corporate 
accountability in context. Next, it determines key players and 
allocates them across the divide for and against the treaty 
movement. The core of this Article analyzes motivations behind 
each side’s treaty stance, with a focus on those reasons aside 
from a desire to respect human rights. These motivations 
include how a binding treaty and its drafting processes itself 
affect national bargaining power and reputational risks. Further 
motivations are increasingly underhanded; they include the 
desire to obfuscate, distract from human rights discourse, and 
shift blame away from state actors. Additionally, this Article 
explores how a binding instrument can counterintuitively offer 
more flexibility than a broad, encompassing voluntary one, and 
allows the reader to draw his or her own conclusion as to 
whether, in the face of these motivations, the path towards a 
BHR treaty can still lead to a net positive gain for human rights 
principles. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. HOLDING CORPORATIONS ACCOUNTABLE 
Holding corporations to account for complicity in human 
rights crimes goes at least as far back at the Nuremburg trials 
post World War II.10 Corporations in Germany benefited greatly 
from the forced labor and other human rights atrocities of the 
 
Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739, 749 (1970). This might be done 
through subsidiaries in a process that is not always transparent. 
 10. Ramasastry, supra note 9, at 104. 
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oppressive Nazi regime.11 The United States Military Tribunal 
tried directors from three German companies, and found them 
culpable for plunder, slavery, and mass murder.12 These trials 
held corporate leadership as accountable for the actions of their 
businesses as it found politicians accountable for the actions of 
the state. One of the most famous cases from these trials was 
that of Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, CEO of the 
Krupp Holding.13 His firm was found to have exploited forced 
labor from Nazi concentration camps among other human rights 
cruelties.14 In his defense, Alfried Krupp stated that “[w]e 
Krupps never cared much for [political] ideas. We only wanted a 
system that worked well and allowed us to work unhindered. 
Politics is not our business.”15 Despite the adage nullum crimen 
sine lege,16 the Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach trial 
shows that corporations and their directors cannot ignore basic 
human decency.17 
In 1972, the UN formed a “Group of Eminent Persons” to 
look further into moral issues and regulations of transnational 
corporations.18 This group was extremely controversial, yet it 
helped lead to the creation of the United Nations Center on 
Transnational Corporations (“UNCTC”), which took the lead on 
developing a code of conduct for transnational corporations.19 
This group was embroiled in antipathy between developing 
socialist countries and more developed economies.20 The 
ideological debate was built on fundamental differences of 
interest: low-income countries wanted to increase foreign 
investment, while developed countries aimed to protect domestic 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 105–06. 
 13. Anti-Defamation League, Nuremberg Trials 60th Anniversary: The 
Krupp Trial, DIMENSIONS: A JOURNAL OF HOLOCAUST STUDIES (Fall 2006), 
http://archive.adl.org/education/dimensions_19/section3/krupp.html#.VgMmC7
T5pUQ (last visited Oct. 22, 2016). 
 14. Ramasastry, supra note 9, at 111. 
 15. Anti-Defamation League, supra note 13. 
 16. “No crime without a law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 17. See Devin Pendas, Law, Not Vengeance, in TRUTH CLAIMS: 
REPRESENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 23, 26 (Mark Phillip Bradley & Patrice 
Petro eds., 2002). 
 18. Theodore H. Moran, The United Nations and Transnational 
Corporations: A Review and a Perspective, United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, 18 TRANSNAT’L CORPS. 91, 92 (2009). 
 19. TAGI SAGAFI-NEJAD, THE UN AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: 
FROM CODE OF CONDUCT TO GLOBAL COMPACT, 89–97 (2008). 
 20. Moran, supra note 18, at 92. 
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enterprises.21 It received further criticism for exacerbating 
economic disparities and operating inefficiently, approaching 
corruption.22 Following more than 20 years of little or no 
progress, the UNCTC was disbanded as a spectacular failure.23 
Later, in 1999, then-Secretary General of the UN, Kofi 
Annan, announced the Global Compact, a set of aspirational 
voluntary norms to which businesses could pledge.24 This 
attempt by the United Nations joined a variety of other 
independent frameworks, including the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), the 
International Labor Organization (“ILO”), civil society 
recommendations, and internal corporate codes of conduct.25 By 
some accounts, the Global Compact was wildly successful: in less 
than ten years, over 4,700 businesses had signed on.26 Although 
this seems impressive at first, the number of businesses to join 
comprise less than 7 percent of the 75,000 transnational 
corporations.27 Thus, while cultural views were changing, the 
United Nations was doing too little, and too slowly, to ensure 
corporate accountability. Yet, the stage was set for the next step 
in formalizing corporate social responsibility. 
Eventually, in 2011, the UN ratified the Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights.28 The UNGP are considered 
“soft law,” meaning that they are not binding on any member 
state; rather, they attempt to show a set of best practices for 
businesses to follow, under the understanding that “companies 
 
 21. Karl Sauvant, The Negotiations of the United Nations Code of Conduct 
on Transnational Corporations: Experience and Lessons Learned, 16 J. WORLD 
INV. & TRADE 11, 20–23 (2015). Note that these interests are not a zero-sum, 
yet inability to compromise eventually led to no movement on these issues. 
 22. See, e.g., JULIANA GERAN, THE CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS: HOW THE U.N. INJURES POOR NATIONS (1987). 
 23. See LOUIS EMMERIJ & RICHARD JOLLY, U.N. INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
PROJECT, THE UN AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BRIEFING NOTE 
NUMBER 17 2 (2009) (explaining that though the UNCTC made significant 
contributions in documenting the activities of transnational corporations, it was 
dismantled in the face of changing UN goals from designing codes of conduct to 
“inviting” transnational corporations to “join a global compact to further the 
common good.”). 
 24. Carolin F Hillemanns, UN Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights, 4 GERMAN L.J. 1065, 1066 (2003). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Moran, supra note 18, at 105. 
 27. Hillemanns, supra note 24, at 1069. 
 28. Ruggie, supra note 8, at 3–5. 
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do not succeed in societies which fail.”29 These Principles 
acknowledge the state duty to protect human rights and 
additionally expose a corollary duty among corporations.30 
Functionally, the UNGP have encouraged states to develop a 
mutually-beneficial team relationship with corporations to 
ensure all stakeholders respect human rights. In 2014, the 
Human Rights Council at the UN pushed member states to 
create their own National Action Plans (“NAP”s) to implement 
the UNGP within their own territory.31 Though the Group of 
Eminent Persons has made significant progress, it is too soon to 
tell what its legacy will be. The logical next step, however, is to 
codify these principles into a binding resolution for all UN 
member states to ratify and enforce within their borders. An 
international BHR Treaty is an admirable goal that could do 
much to protect the rights of all people. 
B. PROPONENTS OF THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
TREATY 
The movement pushing for the creation of a BHR Treaty 
presents us with a unique challenge: the examination of 
principled dialogue versus political rhetoric. Ecuador, which 
suffers from chronic human rights violations and state 
constraints on freedoms, is a prime example of this challenge. 
According to Amnesty International, Ecuador fails to protect the 
rights of indigenous peoples, and continually attacks critics of 
the government and human rights defenders.32 There are also 
issues with arbitrary detention, torture, freedom of speech, and 
gender equality.33 
It is curious, then, that Ecuador led a coalition of nine 
countries and the Arab and Africa Groups in 2013 calling for the 
UNGP to be drafted into an international treaty.34 These 
 
 29. Kofi Annan, 7th Secretary-General of the U.N., Presentation at the 
International Bar Association Showcase Session: Business and Human Rights 
(Oct. 5, 2015) (video available at https://vimeo.com/141529821). 
 30. Ruggie, supra note 8, at 3. 
 31. Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Transnational Corporation 
and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.1, at 2 (June 23, 2014). 
 32. Amnesty Int’l, State of the World’s Human Rights 2014/15, AI Index 
POL 10/0012015, at 135 (Feb. 25, 2015). 
 33. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2014: ECUADOR 2–5 (2014); see 
also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, 
ECUADOR 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 1, 3, 11–12, 27–28 (2013). 
 34. Global Movement for a Binding Treaty, TREATY ALLIANCE, 
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countries issued a statement at the 24th Session of the Human 
Rights Council that read: “A legally binding instrument would 
provide the framework for enhanced State action to protect 
rights and prevent the occurrence of violations.”35 Even Algeria, 
a state that tried to administratively eliminate the Guiding 
Principles, 36 is now pressing for the creation of a treaty.37 We 
must therefore examine why countries such as these—in 
addition to Cuba, Somalia, and Chad, all of which have received 
the worst possible human rights scores38—are clamoring for the 
passage of a human rights treaty.39 Perhaps, as some opponents 
argue, the movement for a business and human rights treaty is 
not about protecting human rights. 
C. OPPONENTS TO THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
TREATY 
A comprehensive study conducted by Oona Hathaway 
tracked the status of human rights, covering over 45 years and 
166 countries, to see if human rights treaties had had the desired 
effect.40 Her study found that not one treaty had a positive effect 
on human rights, and surprisingly, some actually made the 
situation they governed worse.41 This sentiment is echoed by 
Eric Posner, who states that “there is little evidence that human 
rights treaties, on the whole, have improved the well-being of 
people, or even resulted in respect for the rights in those 
treaties.”42 Posner likewise takes a careful look at data collected 
by Freedom House and determines that “[s]ome evidence 
 
http://www.treatymovement.com/history (last visited Sept. 17, 2016). 
 35. Statement on Behalf of a Group of Countries at the 24th Session of the 
Human Rights Council (Sept. 2013), http://business-humanrights.org/media/
documents/statement-unhrc-legally-binding.pdf. 
 36. JOHN RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS xlix (2013). 
 37. Global Movement for a Binding Treaty, supra note 34. 
 38. Freedom in the World: Aggregate and Subcategory Scores, 2015 
Subcategory Scores, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report
/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores#.VSkGiLqJdUQ (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2016). 
 39. Global Movement for a Binding Treaty, supra note 34. 
 40. Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 
YALE L.J. 1935 (2002). 
 41. Id. at 1940. 
 42. ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 7 (Geoffrey R. 
Stone ed., 2014). 
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suggests that certain authoritarian regimes actually engaged in 
more violations after ratifying human rights treaties.”43 
With this counterintuitive phenomenon, perhaps it is 
understandable why some of the most outspoken critics of a BHR 
treaty include John Ruggie, drafter of the UNGP, 44 and powerful 
modern countries which traditionally support advances in 
human rights, such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom. These developed Western countries have a great deal 
to lose in the treaty-creation process and eventual adoption of a 
binding instrument. As described below, considerations of 
bargaining power and political capital must be addressed. But 
Western countries may also be taking a pragmatic approach, 
opposing the BHR Treaty because of the negative effect it could 
have on human rights. 
D. BARGAINING POWER 
As shown above, the human right of self-determination is a 
strong bargaining chip. The human rights movement is 
essentially one of equality, and thus may be viewed as a 
rebalance of power. Although human rights are normatively 
thought of as a Western device, they have gained support in 
transitioning nations. Posner points out that “many treaties, 
while heavily influenced by Western norms, were actually 
initiated by groups in developing countries who hoped to 
improve rights in those countries and sought outside support.”45 
But again, one needs to examine the motive behind this shift to 
understand if states are acting out of altruism or self-interest. 
The double-edged sword of human rights can be used by low-
income states to gain power over more developed countries. 
Part of this perverse incentive would be to use the treaty as 
a way for developing governments to discriminate against 
foreign MNCs. The current drafting of the BHR treaty would 
only limit the behavior of large interstate corporations and 
would not affect domestic companies.46 This would allow 
 
 43. Id. at 76. 
 44. Christen Broecker, “Better the Devil You Know”: Home State 
Approaches to Transnational Corporate Accountability, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 159, 176 (2008). 
 45. Posner, supra note 42, at 22. 
 46. Toby Webb, Business and Human Rights, Back on the UN Agenda, 
SUSTAINABILITY = SMART BUSINESS (July 11, 2014), http://sustainablesmart
business.com/2014/07/business-and-human-rights-back-on-un/. 
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domestic corporations to comply solely with local law and 
continue to abuse human rights while foreign companies would 
be hamstrung by comparison.47 A less pessimistic view within 
this similar vein of reasoning is simply to state that this treaty 
is but an attempt by developing governments to attain some 
modicum of control over transnational corporations.48 One might 
think that governments would have enough bargaining power to 
contract MNC’s into a beneficial arrangement; however, many 
developing countries are so desperate for Foreign Direct 
Investment (“FDI”) that they often give such MNCs wide 
latitude for operations.49 Professor Ruggie explains, “[s]tates 
that host multinationals compete for foreign investment; home 
states are concerned that their firms might lose out on 
investment opportunities abroad to less scrupulous 
competitors.”50 This could be understood to mean that 
developing countries are attempting to level the playing field so 
as to keep their local businesses competitive. However, there is 
a clear concern that without corresponding local regulations, the 
disadvantaged would trade one abuser for another.51 
E. POLITICAL CAPITAL 
Opposing the treaty movement are modern democracies like 
the United States and the United Kingdom, both of whom likely 
have more to lose from ratifying a BHR treaty. Ironically, 
countries that already take measures to respect human rights 
are not greatly inhibited by additional treaties. “So, in one sense 
the human rights treaties do not require the developed countries 
to do anything different from what they have done in the past.”52 
If this is true, why, then, would states object to an instrument 
which may not actually inhibit them? Professor Hathaway’s 
research also shows that countries with a poor human rights 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Scott Jerbi, Business and Human Rights at the UN: What Might 
Happen Next?, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 299, 302 (2009). 
 49. Id. at 303. 
 50. Ruggie, supra note 36, at xxii. 
 51. See Doug Cassel, Treaty Process Gets Underway: Whoever Said It Would 
Be Easy?, BUS. AND HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR., http://business-
humanrights.org/en/treaty-process-gets-underway-whoever-said-it-would-be-
easy (last visited Oct. 23, 2016). 
 52. Posner, supra note 42, at 31. 
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record are more likely to ratify human rights treaties because 
they have less reputational capital to lose.53 
Furthermore, under the UNGP system, countries and 
corporations have the opportunity to choose to respect human 
rights and be rewarded for it, while a treaty would force entities 
into compliance and punish them for misbehavior.54 The 
dichotomy of volunteerism to mandatory compliance could have 
the negative effect of parties meeting just minimum guidelines. 
Meanwhile, the benefit for state compliance comes more so from 
signing the treaty rather than following its parameters. As 
Hathaway explained: “[C]ountries are rewarded for positions [on 
human rights] rather than [their] effects.”55 
The United States’ standpoint is that the current 
arrangement is more beneficial than a binding instrument.56 
Any treaty would necessarily need to be narrow enough to win 
broad support. This unfortunate consequence could actually 
require states to do less for the human rights agenda than the 
UNGP.57 The United States is not only boycotting the current 
intergovernmental working group on a treaty, but it is urging 
others to do the same.58 The United States Representative to the 
UN Human Rights Council, Stephen Townley, explained: “[W]e 
have not given states adequate time and space to implement the 
Guiding Principles . . . this resolution is a threat to the Guiding 
Principles themselves.”59 His statement expresses the fear that 
a treaty path serves as a distraction to making effective changes 
and finding workable solutions.60 
 
 53. Hathaway, supra note 40, at 2013. 
 54. Giovanni Mantilla, Emerging International Human Rights Norms for 
Transnational Corporations, 15 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 279, 285 (2009). 
 55. Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1941. 
 56. Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve 
Respect for Human Rights?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 925, 926 (2005). 
 57. Mantilla, supra note 54, at 295. 
 58. Carey Biron, Contentious Start for UN Process Toward Business and 
Human Rights Treaty, MINT NEWS PRESS (July 10, 2014), http://www.mint
pressnews.com/contentious-start-u-n-process-toward-business-human-rights-
treaty/193731. 
 59. Id. 
 60. JOLYON FORD, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS BRIDGING THE 
GOVERNANCE GAP 23 (2015). 
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F. BINDING NATURE OF THE INSTRUMENT 
Although human rights discourse is predated by most 
colonizing efforts, the great civilizing missions echo much of the 
same ideas as modern human rights goals. As novelist F. Sionil 
Jose poignantly said: “Colonialism subdues in many dulcet 
guises. It conquered under the pretext of spreading Christianity, 
civilization, law and order, to make the world safe for 
democracy.”61 In addition to revolutionaries using human rights 
to establish oppressive regimes, modern democracies may be 
using human rights as a structure around which international 
law is created and imposed on others. This use of human rights 
begs one to question if human rights have now come to symbolize 
what they had previously been used to destroy; more specifically, 
are international human rights laws a form of neo-colonialism? 
It must be noted that a business and human rights treaty is 
in some ways cultural imperialism. The great debate in human 
rights thought is universality of rights versus cultural 
relativity.62 A BHR treaty could be an indirect way for the West 
to put pressure on the developing world. If human rights are 
universal, then one may argue that human rights are not 
bounded by international law per se. Rather they are a law unto 
themselves. Ruti Teitel asserts that “[b]y grounding the 
protection of persons and people in the ‘association that binds 
the human race,’ the ‘law of humanity’ gives persons and people 
a legal and ethical status that is not entirely dependent on their 
membership in a particular political community.”63 This is as 
much as saying that there is a natural law that supersedes 
 
 61. F. Sionil Jose, Rosales and Pangasinan: Roots – Why They Matter, THE 
PHILIPPINE STAR, http://www.philstar.com/arts-and-culture/2014/03/17/1301
139/rosales-and-pangasinan-roots-why-they-matter (last updated March 17, 
2014). 
 62. Professor Haque explains it thus: “[H]uman rights are not granted 
either by state or law; rather such rights are intrinsic in humanity. Every 
individual is born with the same rights, making human rights absolute for all 
human beings.” Ehsanul Haque, Universal Human rights and Cultural 
Relativity: Conflict or Reconciliation?, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 19, 22 (Kyriaki Topidi & Lauren Fielder eds., 2013). While 
Professor Napoleon believes that “universal norms” should not be universally 
imposed, noting: “Since our legal orders and law are entirely created within our 
own cultures, it can be difficult to see and understand law in other cultures. In 
other words, law is societally bound – it is only law within the society that 
created it.” Val Napolean, Thinking About Indigenous Legal Orders, in 
DIALOGUES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL PLURALISM 229, 232 (René Provost 
& Colleen Sheppard eds., 2013). 
 63. RUTI TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 195 (2011). 
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national and international norms. The argument follows that 
right and wrong, in the context of human rights, is independent 
of written laws and should apply uniformly to all people 
regardless of culture or treaty signatories. 
The current regime of human rights law is enforced through 
the United Nations in a system overseen by the creation of a 
committee for each treaty,64 as well as through the UN Council 
on Human Rights.65 The problem is particularly clear when 
observing the UN Council on Human Rights. The Council, 
previously known as the Commission, was run by some of “the 
worst human rights violators, including Libya, Saudi Arabia, 
and Sudan.”66 These developing countries found a way to use the 
human rights framework to push their internal agenda and gain 
power. Posner says, “The human rights violators formed 
alliances with each other, and with other countries that cared 
more about diplomatic or strategic cooperation than about 
human rights.”67 If this is the case at the Council and at treaty-
specific committees, then the BHR treaty is an opportunity for 
developing countries to gain power in world politics. 
Furthermore, while these committees lend power and legitimacy 
to the participant states, they are so underfunded and under-
respected that they are not given the power needed to actually 
enforce a treaty. 
G. NARROWING THE SCOPE OF BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
In order for the proposed BHR treaty to come into effect it 
will need the support of a diverse group of states, all with 
competing interests.68 This will cause the eventual treaty to be 
narrow in scope and weak in its ability to protect human rights 
and hold corporations accountable. One of the most vehement 
opponents to a legally binding instrument is John Ruggie, 
drafter of the UNGP and former Special Representative to the 
Secretary General on Business and Human Rights. He warns, 
“[B]usiness and human rights is not so discrete an issue area as 
 
 64. Posner, supra note 42, at 40. 
 65. Id. at 43. 
 66. Id. at 44. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Aaron Rhodes, The False Promise of an International Business and 
Human Rights Treaty, HUFFINGTON POST (July 10, 2014, 6:27 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aaron-rhodes/the-false-promise-of-an-
i_b_5575236.html. 
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to lend itself to a single set of detailed treaty obligations,” and 
that it was “hard to imagine [such a treaty] providing a basis for 
meaningful legal action.”69 In sum, his fear is that a treaty would 
be nothing more than “largely symbolic gestures, of little 
practical use to real people in real places . . . From the vantage 
point of victims, an all-encompassing business and human rights 
treaty . . . is a profound deception.”70 
This has been the case with past human rights treaties. The 
language used is crafted in such a way that the obligations are 
vague and conflicting, or, in some cases, too demanding to be 
realistic.71 Narrow language creates a binding treaty but it does 
not actually force any action among ratifying states and is 
therefore difficult, if not impossible, to enforce. 
Additionally, any language broad enough to get through the 
UN committees will then be subject to construal by individual 
states. States will have the autonomy and authority to interpret 
syntax on favorable terms. For example, by taking leeway with 
ambiguous words such as “reasonable” or “fair” in the ICESCR.72 
To make a treaty even more impotent, countries can ratify it 
along with a reservation or understanding. This means a state 
could ratify a BHR treaty so far as it supports the values of a 
domestic law or constitutional framework.73 Effectively, such 
reservations would make no new commitments whatsoever. 
H. OBFUSCATION 
It is possible that the pro-treaty coalition is pressing for a 
binding instrument just to confuse and clutter up the human 
rights agenda: “[G]iven the tendency of abusive states to foster 
meaningless global human rights legislation and institutions, it 
can be assumed their support is part of a strategy of 
obfuscation.”74 The fear is that the advocacy for a treaty will take 
energy away from states making progress on the UNGP.75 While 
over 600 organizations have put support behind the idea of the 
UN progressing toward a binding treaty, at the time of Ecuador’s 
proposal, only one country had passed a national action plan for 
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compliance with the UNGP.76 Now, over three years later that 
number has risen only to ten states.77 This redirection of civil 
society energy could be a reprieve for states not willing to enforce 
these standards.78 
A BHR treaty is also many years off from going through the 
UN committee review and ratification process. Even Ecuador, in 
2014, estimated that any eventual vote on a BHR treaty is more 
than a decade off.79 This stalling technique is comparable to the 
negotiations surrounding the “Transnational Corporation Code 
of Conduct,” which was abandoned after 22 years of dialogue.80 
If the past is any indication of how this process might go, several 
years will go by before a binding instrument is finally adopted. 
This interim period could allow for states and non-state actors 
to continue to violate human rights all while pointing to a lack 
of consensus on accountability. 
A further concern is with the hypertrophy of human rights. 
If total energy directed at respecting and enforcing human rights 
protections is zero sum, then for each new right or obligation, 
less overall attention and resources can be paid to each. Posner 
points out, “The number of human rights increased from 20 in 
1975, to 100 in 1980, to 175 in 1990, to 300 today.”81 As the 
number of rights increases, each right becomes marginalized 
within the public conscience. “This is why human rights keep 
proliferating and in this way render each other meaningless for 
constraining behavior.”82 In theory, human rights are not 
created; each person is born with the same set of rights as every 
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other member of humanity.83 However, in practice, governments 
have a limited capacity to legislate, enforce, and litigate each 
right. Therefore, as the vocabulary of human rights discourse 
continues to expand, the normative independence of each right 
must shrink.84 
As a very broad example, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) entered into force in 1976 
and provides for equal treatment of women (Article 3); 
prevention of torture (Article 7); and protection of children 
(Article 24).85 In the years following its adoption, the UN 
endorsed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (1979), the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
(1984), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).86 
These treaties may take a complimentary approach rather than 
being in opposition to one another. However, the need for 
additional protections after the passage of the ICCPR forces one 
to wonder about the effectiveness of that document. 
Unfortunately, though these treaties work toward the same 
purpose, “[t]he more human rights there are, and thus the 
greater the variety of human interests that are protected, the 
more that the human rights system collapses into an 
undifferentiated welfarism in which all interests must be taken 
seriously for the sake of the public good.”87 Historically, it may 
be that “recognizing” a new right might be simpler than 
enforcing rights which are already understood. 
 
 83. This is why most human treaties “recognize” a right as opposed to 
establishing or creating a right. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
Nov. 29, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 84. GRET HALLER, HUMAN RIGHTS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY?: RECONCILING 
FREEDOM WITH EQUALITY, 147 (Cynthia Klohr trans., Berghahn Books 2012) 
(2012). 
 85. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 86. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
 87. Posner, supra note 42, at 94. 
78 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:1 
I. BLAME SHIFTING 
Multi-national corporations often balk at doing business in 
states with poor human rights records. Some MNCs may have 
chosen not to incorporate in or do extensive business dealings 
with certain states based on their negative treatment by civil 
society organizations. This can be due to official international 
sanctions, or it can be the effect of progressive corporate 
citizenship. Foreign direct investment is absolutely crucial for 
the success of many developing states; they are thus encouraged 
to increase their human rights protections. However, shifting 
the responsibility to protect from states to corporations could 
make the state appear better without making any positive 
difference in the human rights sector. If the human rights 
watchdogs no longer were so scathing of these developing 
countries, perhaps it would encourage more FDI.88 This 
proposition is consistent with data showing that when a 
developing country signals it will improve its human rights 
record, outside investment increases.89 This also might mean 
that backing a treaty could be as productive as signing the treaty 
itself. 
Ruggie has also expressed fears that shifting the blame from 
countries to corporations undermines development.90 An added 
benefit for these states is that by shifting the responsibility, it is 
possible they would be subject to fewer sanctions.91 Currently, 
the international community sanctions states for unacceptable 
behaviors. A binding legal treaty could cause some of those 
sanctions to be lifted. In sum, shifting responsibility to 
businesses allows states to avoid the responsibility to protect 
human rights.92 If this were the case, it explains why such 
nations would so adamantly support this treaty: it would turn 
the gaze from the Western NGOs to MNCs operating within 
their borders. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
As we have seen, the issues surrounding a BHR treaty are 
complex and may, measured by some, even be underhanded. 
This Article does not take the Kantian approach that for a treaty 
to be morally good, it must be supported for moral reasons; 
rather, there is the possibility that a good thing done for the 
wrong reasons can still lead to positive outcomes.93 However, the 
international community should proceed cautiously to prevent 
the human rights movement from becoming political rhetoric 
and a tool to the detriment of human rights. Simply by 
supporting the treaty process, states have the opportunity 
improve their human rights records at face value, encouraging 
investment. Additionally, proponents may be supportive of a 
possible binding instrument in the future to distract from their 
behavior in the present. This reprieve might pay off for mal-
actors regardless of whether the treaty is eventually passed. If 
the treaty fails, the current non-binding instruments will have 
been diluted. If the treaty passes, however, it shifts 
responsibility from states and emboldens domestic corporations. 
Adversaries of the binding instrument negotiations take 
issue with the likelihood of a treaty finding consensus and with 
the eventual effectiveness that document would have. They 
make the argument that valuable time will be lost in 
negotiations; while the UN debates the exact treaty parameters, 
states can use this lack of consensus as a reason to not act to 
protect human rights. Because of the binding nature of any 
treaty, many of the obligations most needed to protect human 
rights will be left out, losing the comprehensive nature of the 
UNGP. The UNGP is voluntary, a choice that creates cohesion 
rather than derision resulting from forced compliance.94 
It is clear that there is still much to be done to adequately 
protect all person from human rights abuses by corporations and 
countries alike. Human rights treaties have much room to grow, 
and one way would be through a Business and Human Rights 
treaty. Even for self-interested developing countries, such a 
treaty would benefit both country and citizen. Conversely, 
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although Western democracies have good reasons for 
disapproving of the treaty process, it may fail without any of 
their guidance, input, and support.95 Both sides must find 
common ground upon which to develop a long-term agreement 
that could eventually be converted into a binding legal 
instrument.96 
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